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JUNIOR SECURED CREDITORS AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
DAVID GRAY CARLSON • 
Suppose D grants a senior security interest to A and subsequently grants a junior 
security interest to B. If D files for bankruptcy, an automatic stay arises to enjoin A 
and B from foreclosing on the security interest-or so the world presumes. 
What if B files for bankruptcy and D does not? Is A stayed from foreclosing 
against D, when the result of the foreclosure must be the termination of B's security 
interest? B's security interest is property of the estate, and Bankruptcy Code section 
362(a)(4) prevents "any act to ... enforce any lien against property of the estate."1 
That is precisely what A is doing when A sells D's property free and clear of B's 
security interest. 
Only a few courts have considered the matter, but a majority of these have held 
that the automatic stay in B's bankruptcy does not restrain A from destroying B's 
security interest by foreclosing. The grounds for so concluding, however, are not 
satisfactory. The plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code-admittedly a treacherous 
commodity-is against such a result. So are the policy reasons that inhabit the 
automatic stay in the first place. The majority view is based on some intuition that 
B's security interest is too minor to justify protection by the automatic stay. Yet a 
close examination of this intuition shows that the majority view cannot logically be 
maintained. 
The aim of this article is to describe the law of the automatic stay with regard to 
junior creditors. As a preliminary exercise, I will explore a theoretical difficulty 
deeply embedded in the text of the Bankruptcy Code. Part One of this Article will 
show that the Bankruptcy Code has an incoherent theory of property. Sometimes 
property means the relation of the debtor to a thing. At other times, property means 
the thing itself. On the former meaning, cotenancies of nondebtors are not property 
of the estate. On the latter meaning, cotenancies are swept into the estate, because the 
thing itself is within the estate. On this latter view, both the debtor's cotenancy and 
nondebtor cotenancies are in the estate. If we view a security interest as a kind of 
shared cotenancy, the security interest is beyond the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
courts on the former view and within that jurisdiction on the latter view. 
Nevertheless, the automatic stay exceeds the scope of the bankruptcy estate.2 It is 
therefore clear that a debtor's bankruptcy stays the foreclosure of a security interest 
on the whole of the collateral. 
Part Two of this article will assume that B is bankrupt but D is not. It should be 
the case that A is stayed by B's bankruptcy-:-both on the language of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the implicit policy behind debtor rehabilitation. 
Part Three will reverse the presumption. Suppose D is bankrupt but B is not. A is 
clearly stayed, but D's trustee may not choose to pursue enforcement remedies 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
I 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1994). 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 11-15. 
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against A. Part Three inquires whether B has standing to enforce the automatic stay. 
Although the case law is divided on this point, the preferred view is that the 
Bankruptcy Code invests discretion with the trustee alone to enforce the stay. A grant 
of standing in B would interfere with that investment of discretion and therefore 
should not be permitted. Rather, B should be required to follow bankruptcy 
procedures against the trustee directly, to compel the trustee to perform her fiduciary 
duty, when B feels such duty is being neglected. 
I. THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND FORECLOSURE 
We start with a very basic question. Suppose a debtor grants a security interest, 
defaults and files for bankruptcy. Does the automatic stay prevent the secured party 
from foreclosing? Bankruptcy lawyers are likely to perceive the question as an easy 
one,3 but, thanks to the Bankruptcy Code's club-footed prose, interpretive work is 
required to reach this obvious result. 
A "devil's advocate" might make the following case that the automatic stay does 
not apply to prevent foreclosure by secured parties: the automatic stay prevents 
actions against "property of the estate. "4 Yet, in defining "property of the estate," 
section 541(a)(l) brings in only "interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case. "5 In the simple case of a debtor who has granted a 
security interest in collateral to a secured party, the "debtor's interest" was only the 
equity interest. The security interest as such would seem to be outside the estate, 
thus, it is possible that the automatic stay would not prevent enforcement of the 
security interest. Since the security interest was outside the estate, it could be 
foreclosed. If the security interest had the effect of foreclosing the debtor's equity 
position, this could be overlooked as being an indirect or incidental effect. The loss 
of the debtor equity might then be viewed as a kind of condition subsequent on the 
debtor equity. By way of analogy, if a bankrupt debtor owned an estate that was 
defeasible, the estate goes out of existence if the defeasible event occurs, regardless 
of the automatic stay, which does not work to prevent conditions from occurring.6 
Likewise, if a debtor equity goes out of existence because the secured party chooses 
3 But see In re Karls, 208 B.R. 913, 916-17 (Banlcr. W.D. Wis. 1997) (finding secured creditor could 
foreclose on cattle because debtors had no right to redeem collateral). In Karis, Judge Thomas Utschig 
inexplicably overlooked U.C.C. § 9-506, which expressly provides the redemptive right Utschig thought was 
lacking. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1977). 
4 11 u.s.c. § 362(aX3). 
5 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l). 
6 For this reason, the automatic stay does not prevent time from running on redemption periods and the like. 
See Counties Contracting & Constr. Co. v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 855 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(Mansmann, J.) (acknowledging most courts hold section 362's prohibition against actions taken to obtain 
possession of estate's property does not affect tolling). 
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to foreclose, the automatic stay is in no way offended. So ends the catechism of the 
devil's advocate.7 
What makes this argument work is that section 541 (a) brings into the bankruptcy 
estate the debtor's interest in a thing, not the thing itself. The courts, however, have 
gone beyond the literal language of section 54l(a) to expand the parameters of the 
bankruptcy estate. In the important case of United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 8 
Justice Harry Blackmun found it worthwhile to explain why the thing; not just the 
debtor's interest in the thing, is part of the estate: 
Although these statutes could be read to limit the estate to those 
"interests of the debtor in property" at the time of the filing of the 
petition, we view them as a definition of what is included in the 
estate, rather than as a Iimitation.9 
The point of this remark is to establish that the bankruptcy estate exceeds the words 
of section 54l(a). Thus, the estate includes not only the debtor's interest but the 
secured party's share of an encumbered thing. Under this dictum, since the trustee can 
use "property of the estate,1110 the trustee can use the whole of a thing, not just the 
debtor's equity in the thing. And to protect this power to use, the automatic stay 
prevents a secured party from foreclosing on the collateral after a debtor files for 
bankruptcy. Thanks to the supplement provided by Whiting Pools to the language of 
section 541 (a), the automatic stay prevents foreclosure of the security interest after 
all. 
A different point clinches the matter. Section 54l(a) defines property of the 
estate. Section 362(a)(3) stays "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate 
or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate." 11 
This language protects not only the debtor's interest in the thing but the whole thing 
7 Such an argument was actually used for a time in a different context. According to section 522(f)(IXB), a 
debtor could avoid nonpossessory nonpurchase money security interests in certain exempt property "to the 
extent that such lien impairs an exemption." Often, state law allowed for an exemption of debtor equity in a 
thing-not the thing-in-itself. If so, secured parties successfully argued that the security interest stopped just 
short of the exemption and so did not impair it. The security interest therefore could not be avoided under 
section 522(f)(IXB), if this argument was accepted. Although the Supreme Court and Congress both acted to 
squelch this theory, it did carry the day in many circuits. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (defining impairment 
in such a way as to obviate this argument); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1991) (Scalia, J.) 
(overruling this argument on pre-1994 version of section 522(f)); see also David Gray Carlson, Security 
Interests on Exempt Property After the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 57, 64-67 (1996) (discussing concept of impairment). 
1 462 U.S. 198 (1983). 
9 Id. at 203. 
10 11 U.S.C. § 363(bXI) (providing trustee may use, sell, or lease property of the estate in ordinary course of 
business). 
11 II U.S.C. § 362(aX3)(emphasis added). 
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itself. An attempt to control the whole thing would constitute an attempt to control 
the debtor's limited interest in the thing. Thus, the scope of section 362(aX3)'s 
prohibition exceeds the reach of section 54 l(a) to stay foreclosure sales. 12 Similarly, 
section 362(aX4) prevents "any act to ... enforce any lien against property of the 
estate."13 Hence, even if the lien is beyond the estate, enforcement of lien against 
property of the estate is stayed. 14 Fortunately, we need not wrestle with the 
inadequacies of section 541(a). The scope of the automatic stay exceeds the scope of 
section 541(a).15 . 
It is hoped the overly basic nature of these remarks will be excused, as they will 
be useful in fathoming the difficult issues in the next section, pertaining to the 
automatic stay arising from the bankruptcy of a debtor's transferee. 
II. 1i-lE JUNIOR SECURED CREDITOR AS BANKRUPT 
Suppose D conveys a perfected security interest to A. This security interest is a 
power of sale (and, in the case of receivables and the like, a power to liquidate by 
collecting). More precisely, A is empowered to sell whatever D had at the time As 
lien was created.16 This formula indicates that, if D had an absolute interest at the 
time As lien was created, A may convey an absolute title in the collateral to a buyer 
in a foreclosure sale. This is so even if the debtor has made subsequent conveyances 
to B, whether those conveyances be total alienation, junior liens, or leasehold 
interests. Any such conveyance is made subject to As lien. 
To test this out, suppose, after D grants a security interest to A, D alternately 
grants ( 1) the equity to B, (2) a junior security interest to B, or (3) a leasehold to B. D 
defaults, and A sells to X. X takes whatever D had at the time A's lien was created. 
Since D had an absolute title at that time, X likewise has an absolute title. And if X 
has an absolute title, B must have nothing, regardless which of the three interests D 
12 See Rhonda S. Berliner, Note, Bankruptcy and Subleases: The Depravity of Privily, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
193, 202 (1992) (explaining bankruptcy estate is "exclusively" property described in section 54l(a), but if 
property does not come under section 54 l(a), it can not be "from" or "of' estate). 
13 11 u.s.c. § 362(aX4). 
14 See Mann v. Alexander Dawson, Inc. (In re Mann) 907 F.2d 923, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing 
stay of all proceedings related to foreclosure); Phoenix Bond & lndem. Co. v. Shamblin (In re Shamblin), 
890 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that any foreclosure sale that violates automatic stay under 
section 362 is void); Harsh Inv. Corp. v. Bialac (In re Bialac), 712 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(acknowledging right of redemption under section 541 that is covered by automatic stay). 
15 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
16 See David Gray Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 547, 565-71 (1984) (discussing typical 
foreclosure statutes governing rights which judgment debtor had when judicial lien arose). 
1998] JUNIOR SECURED CREDITORS 253 
granted to B. B's property interest-be it large or small-has been effectively 
foreclosed. 17 
A. The Argument in Favor of the Automatic Stay 
We are concerned with the extent of the automatic stay ansmg from B's 
bankruptcy, and whether it prohibits action by A. A good argument exists that a 
uniform rule should apply to any conveyance that D might make to B. Suppose D 
quitclaims all right, title and interest to B, and then B goes bankrupt. Whatever rule 
we apply to B's automatic stay should likewise apply when D conveys a lesser 
interest to D--a security interest or lease, for example. 
Let's start with the basic case of D's quitclaim of all right, title and interest to B. 
Upon such a conveyance, B owns the equity, and A has become a nonrecourse 
creditor of B.18 Indeed, under Article 9, B is even defined as a "debtor." 19 Clearly, A 
is stayed from foreclosing on B's equity when B files for bankruptcy.20 
17 See U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1977) ("When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the 
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the security interest 
under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto."). 
11 A "nonrecourse" secured party is one who has the right to foreclose on the collateral but does not have the 
right to sue the debtor personally for the underlying debt. See, e.g., Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana 
de Fomento (In re Vintero Corp.), 735 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 1984). Nonrecourse debt can arise in various 
ways. First, the secured creditor and the debtor may contract for no recourse. This is commonly done in 
commercial real estate lending for tax reasons. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc. 
(In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 552, 567 (3d Cir. 1994) (en bane) (Greenberg, J.). Second; the 
debtor may have obtained a bankruptcy discharge from all personal debts. The security interest, however, may 
have been left intact. In light of the discharge, the creditor has a nonrecourse security interest. See, e.g. , 
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85 (1991) (Marshall, J.) (finding creditor who has claim 
enforceable only against the debtor's property nonetheless has "claim against the debtor" for purposes of 
section l02(2)); In re Stanley, 185 B.R. 417,426 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (Shiff, J.) (opining section 506(a) is 
not intended to be used to deprive nonrecourse creditors of either automatic right to recourse treatment granted 
by section I 11 l(bXIXA) or of right to elect to have its claim treated as fully secured claim). Finally, the debtor 
may have bought encumbered collateral from the person who granted the original security interest. After the 
sale, the security interest continues to encumber the collateral, but, as the buyer did not promise to pay the 
debt, the secured creditor has recourse against the buyer. See, e.g., 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs. v. Mutual Benefit 
Life Ins. Co. in Rehabilitation (In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs.), 29 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1994) (Walker, J.). 
The Bankruptcy Code's definitional machinery for describing nonrecourse claims is cumbersome. 
"[C]laim" is defined as "right to payment ... secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § l01(5) (1994). Whether 
nonrecourse lenders have a claim under this definition is hard to say. Fortunately, creditors do have claims 
against the debtor by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) (stating "'claim against the debtor' includes claim against 
property of the debtor"). If nonrecourse lenders have "claims," then it follows that they are "creditors." A 
"creditor" is: 
(A) [an] entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before 
the order for relief concerning the debtor; [or] 
(B) [an] entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section 
348(d), 502(t), 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) . .. . 
I 1 U.S.C. § IOl(IO). 
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Now why should this be so? First, the language of section 362(a) exceeds the 
scope of the bankruptcy estate. Hence, the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code 
demands it.21 Second, whether D or B owns the equity, the basic policy of the 
Bankruptcy Code is that the bankruptcy trustee of the equity owner should have the 
opportunityto maximize the value of the equity. A has no good incentive to do so. A, 
holding a senior lien, will seek a price only insofar as the price pays A '.S' senior lien. A 
trustee for the equity owner, however, has an incentive to seek more. Anything that 
this trustee obtains above A '.S' lien enriches the unsecured creditors of the bankrupt 
owner of the equity. 
This policy of putting the trustee in charge when appreciation value can be 
coaxed from collateral is on display in section 362(d)(2), which provides that the 
secured party may have relief from the stay if both the following are true: (1) "the 
debtor does not have an equity in such ~roperty,"22 and (2) "such property is not 
necessary to an effective reorganization." 3 These two principles end up describing 
the Bankruptcy Code's criteria for a trustee's control of collateral claimed by secured 
parties. 
Though the matter is rarely articulated, Judge Stephen Gerling has suggested that 
the fundamental key to bankruptcy policy is the possibility of appreciation value.24 
When a creditor claims any sort of lien on property that goes up in value, the 
creditor's immediate liquidation of such property effectively deprives the debtor (and 
her unsecured creditors) of any potential upside. The secured creditor must therefore 
suffer the law's delay and the insolence of office, because bankruptcy jurisdiction 
hopes to nurture appreciation value in favor of unsecured creditors.25 
If appreciation value describes when a trustee should retain control over 
collateral, the principle holds whether or not D or B is the owner of the equity. 
Furthermore, it holds whether B has bought the equity outright, or whether B has a 
mere lien on IYs equity. Suppose that D conveys a junior security interest to B, and B 
Nonrecourse lenders have a claim against property of the estate, but these claims are not described in 
sections 348(d), or 502(f) through (i). But, because their claim against property of the debtor is deemed to be a 
claim against the debtor personally, it follows, for those who take definitions seriously, that nonrecourse 
lenders are creditors. The syllogism, though inelegant, ultimately works. 
19 See V .C.C. § 9-IOS(l)(d) (defining debtor). 
20 See 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 29 F.3d at 97 (''The statute thereby puts the Chapter 11 debtor who wishes to 
retain collateral property in the same position as a person who purchased property 'subject to' a mortgage 
lien .. . . "). 
21 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
22 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A). 
23 Id. § 362(d)(2)(B). 
24 See In re Amodio, lSS B.R. 622, 623-25 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing possibility of turnover of 
debtor's funds only if part of debtor's bankruptcy estate). 
25 See Lee R. Bogdanoff, The Purchase and Sale of Assets in Reorganization Cases-Of Interest and 
Principal, of Principles and Interest, 41 Bus. LAW. 1367, 1404 n.129 (1992) (noting unsecured creditors 
have compelling arguments in favor of bankruptcy estate benefiting from appreciation because this 
increases value of unsecured creditor's claims). 
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files for bankruptcy. Does B's bankruptcy trustee have any incentive to increase the 
value of D's equity? The answer is clearly yes. Any amount that exceeds A's lien 
adheres to the benefit of B's unsecured creditors. The policy favoring B's bankruptcy 
trustee applies whether B owned the equity outright or whether B owned a junior lien 
D , . 26 on s equity. 
At least one prominent pre-Code case has held that B's bankruptcy petition stays 
A. In Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc. (In re Fidelity Mortgage 
Jnvestors),27 Judge Joseph Smith cited many of the same policies that motivate 
trustee power over encumbered property in general.28 In particular, the trustee of B 
would like to take over the foreclosure proceeding in order to maximize the value of 
the estate. Whether B owns equity or is a junior secured party, the general creditors 
of B will benefit if B's trustee runs the sale. In neither case can the senior secured 
party be trusted to maximize the interests of junior parties. 
Furthermore, a right of redemption has usually been considered powerful 
evidence that a thing is in the bankruptcy estate.29 It may be pointed out that junior 
secured parties usually have the right to redeem the property from the senior secured 
party, in order to preserve residual value the senior secured party has no incentive to 
realize. Thus, U.C.C. section 9-506 provides: 
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or 
entered into a contract for its disposition under Section 9-504 or 
before the obligation has been discharged under Section 9-505(2) the 
30 debtor or any other secured party may ... redeem ... 
Since redemption coheres with the policy of the Bankruptcy Code to maximize 
property for the benefit of the general creditors, the policy is equally concerned with 
Bas secured creditor as it is with Bas equity owner.3 
26 See Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Bibo, Inc. (In re Bibo, Inc.), 200 B.R. 348, 351 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) 
(Alley, J.) (explaining debtor's interest does not have to be some type of "ownership" for automatic stay to be 
affected by foreclosure).See also In re Village Rathskeller, Inc., 147 B.R. 665, 673-74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(Brozman, J.) (modifying stay where B held junior leasehold, and where no equity existed and property was 
not necessary for effective reorganization). 
27 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976). 
21 If A's foreclosure sale is subject to the automatic stay, it follows that the postpetition attempt at a 
foreclosure sale is a voidable postpetition transfer under section 549(a). See Cohen v. Hahn (In re Golden Plan 
of Cal., Inc.), 39 B.R. 551,555 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984), vacated, 72 B.R. 205 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1986). 
29 See Austein v. Schwartz (In re Gerwer), 898 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990). 
30 U.C.C. § 9-506 (1977) (emphasis added). 
31 See In re Capital Mortgage & Loan, Inc., 35 B.R. 967, 971 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983) (Dahl, J.) (explaining 
A not in violation of stay when it received quitclaim deed from O that did not affect B's lien). 
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B. The Arguments Against the Automatic Stay 
Nevertheless, while courts universally hold A is stayed when B owns the equity,32 
some courts believe otherwise when B owns a mere lien on D's equity. The 
arguments for this position, however, are not successful. 
According to Judge Rebecca Beach Smith in Farmers Bank v. March (In re 
March),33 the automatic stay does not prevent foreclosure of B's junior security 
interest. In so deciding, Judge Smith quoted the following words of Justice Harry 
Blackmun from United States v. Whiting Poo/s:34 
Section 54l(a)(l) speaks in terms of the debtor's "interests ... in 
property," rather than property in which the debtor has an interest, 
but this choice of language was not meant to limit the expansive 
scope of the section. The legislative history indicates that Congress 
intended to exclude from the estate property of others in which the 
debtor had some minor interest such as a lien or bare legal title. 
Similar statements to the effect that § 541 (a)( 1) does not expand the 
rights of the debtor in the hands of the estate were made in the 
context of describing the principle that the estate succeeds to no 
more or greater causes of action against third parties than those held 
by the debtor. These statements do not limit the ability of a trustee to 
regain possession of property in which the debtor had equitable as 
well as legal title.35 · 
In short, B's security interest is a "minor" property right, and so is not to be 
considered part of the bankruptcy estate at all. 
The context of this dictum from Whiting Pools36 merits careful explication. We 
saw in the last section how Justice Blackmun felt compelled to explain that, even 
though Section 54l(a) puts only the debtor's interest in a thing in the estate-not the 
entire thing-the trustee could nevertheless use the entire thing, if useful to maximize 
the return for unsecured creditors. That is, the estate included the entire thing, not 
just the debtor's interest in the thing. For this reason, a secured party is expected to 
donate collateral to the rehabilitation of debtors.37 But Justice Blackmun equally saw 
the danger in bringing in the whole thing when the debtor owned only a scrap of the 
thing. For example, Blackmun's untrammeled doctrine of the thing might suggest 
32 See supra text accompanying notes 19-21 . 
33 140 B.R 387 (E.D. Va. 1992), ajj'd, 988 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1993). 
34 462 U.S. 198 (1983). 
35 Id. at 205 n.8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
36 Upon this dictum rests the intellectual foundation of securitization. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten 
Foundations o/Securitization, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. (forthcoming 1998). 
31 See id. 
1998] JUNIOR SECURED CREDITORS 257 
that, if a debtor owned a security interest in someone else's thing, the debtor's trustee 
could use the thing in order to rehabilitate the debtor. Imagine, if you will, that 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. ("GMAC") filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee 
could use all the cars in which GMAC held a security interest. The automatic stay 
would then apply to prevent consumers from using the cars. The cars could be 
repossessed, and GMAC could go into the car rental business at the expense of 
consumers.
38 Such a thought being monstrous, Justice Blackmun introduced, in the 
passage just quoted, the idea of "minor" debtor interests, "such as a lien."39 Thus, 
section 54l(a)(l) brings in the "whole thing" when the debtor owns a "major" 
interest-such as debtor equity. It does not bring in the whole thing when the debtor 
claims only a "minor" interest-such as a security interest or lien. 
How does this dictum affect the question at hand? D has granted a senior 
security interest to A and a junior security interest to B. B has filed for bankruptcy. 
B's security interest in the "thing" is a minor interest, and so, per Blackmun's 
instruction,Bs trustee cannot use Ds thing to rehabilitateB. But this dictum does not 
really answer the question whether A may foreclose As security interest in D's thing. 
D has never filed for bankruptcy. A is not prevented by Ds bankruptcy from 
repossessing the thing and foreclosing. But As foreclosure would also have the effect 
of foreclosingB. Thus, Bs security interest in D's thing may be "minor" insofar as D 
31 Something like this was proposed in First Fed. Bank of Cal. v. Cogar (In re Cogar), 210 B.R. 803, 805-12 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). In that case, the junior secured party filed a chapter 11 case. The trustee for the junior 
secured party proposed a plan in which the defaulting equity owners would deed the property to the 
bankruptcy estate in lieu of foreclosure. The plan would then cram down the senior secured party. The junior 
secured party would then sell back the equity to the very same owners. To make matters worse, the trustee's 
junior lien was valueless because it was considerably under water. 
This case differs from the GMAC example in the text, in that the equity owners were willing to convey 
their property to the chapter 11 trustee. Given that willingness, there is nothing in chapter 11 that prevents 
reorganizing the equity owners through the chapter 11 proceeding of the junior secured party. Nevertheless, 
Judge Lawrence Ollason would not allow it for three reasons: (1) it had never been done before; (2) the 
obtainment of the equity owners' interest would be "after-acquired property" in the bankruptcy estate and 
hence not property of the estate; (3) the senior secured party was not a creditor in the junior secured party's 
bankruptcy and so could not be affected by the chapter 11 plan. 
None of these reasons are convincing. ( 1) Just because something has never been done does not mean it 
cannot be done, when the statute allows for it. The Bankruptcy Code has not enacted Egyptianism as one of its 
principles. (2) The equity interest may be "after-acquired property," but it is nevertheless property of the estate 
under section 54l(aX6) because it is proceeds of the security interest that the bankruptcy trustee would be 
foreclosing. (3) The senior secured creditor was indeed a nonrecourse creditor in the junior secured party's 
bankruptcy. A senior lien is always a lien on the junior lien, by its very nature. No one doubts that if the owner 
of equity were to convey all the equity to a person who files for bankruptcy, the senior secured party would be 
a nonrecourse creditor in the bankruptcy. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. Why does the principle 
change when the equity owners convey a lesser interest-a security interest-to the same person? 
In truth, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits the plan proposed in Cogar. The plan was undoubtedly 
an outrage to intuition. Perhaps the best view of the case is that it goes to the bad faith of the plan. Plans can 
only be confirmed when they are in good faith. See 11 U.S.C. § l 129(aX3) (1994). 
39 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 205 n.8 (emphasis added). 
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is concerned. But it does not necessarily follow that B's interest is minor insofar as A 
is concerned. A and B are equally minor to D, but perhaps vis-a-vis each other, they 
are "major." Some legislative history makes this explicit. According to 
Congressman Don Edwards: 
The addition of this provision by the House amendment merely 
clarifies that section 54l(a) is an all-embracing definition which 
includes charges on property, such as liens held by the debtor on 
property of a third party . .. . 40 
Whiting Pools, then, cannot serve as the ultimate justification of the principle that A 
may foreclose on the collateral free and clear of the automatic stay generated by B's 
bankruptcy. Rather, Whiting Pools suggests only that B may not expropriate D's 
equity interest for the purpose of enriching B's unsecured creditors. 
Other contrary arguments in favor of holding senior secured parties free and clear 
of the junior secured party's automa· · ~ stay usually end up being unjustified 
assertions. According to one commentator, the automatic stay should not apply to A 
because 
there were no "financial pressures" on [B] with respect to the subject 
collateral ... that drove [B] into bankruptcy. [B] is, in fact, a 
"creditor" with respect to the property . .. [B] has no "repayment" 
that it must make to the senior secured creditor. It is obvious that the 
purpose of enacting the automatic stay was not intended to protect a 
debtor who is actually a "creditor."41 
None of these allegations is true or even relevant. B may be bankrupt because the 
equity owner has defaulted on its obligations to B. Therefore, financial pressures 
related to the collateral may well be to blame for B's bankruptcy. If not, so what? 
The automatic stay does not apply only to the property that causes the bankruptcy. If 
a secured party claims a speed boat from a debtor who went bankrupt speculating on 
commodity futures, the automatic stay prevents foreclosure on the boat even if the 
boat is unrelated to the market for commodities.42 Furthermore, all debtors are also 
creditors of other debtors, but that has never made a difference to the scope of the 
40 124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Congressman Edwards). 
41 Thomas J. Holthus, A Debtor as a "Creditor" and the Automatic Stay, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 377, 380 
(1988). 
42 Of course, the stay might be lifted in such a case, if the speed boat is unnecessary to the right proceeding. 
See II U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B); In re Walters, 188 B.R. 582, 586 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995) (Fussell, J.) (lifting 
stay on speed boat); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing relief of stay if "such property 
is not necessary to an effective reorganization"). This is a different question from whether the stay applies in 
the first instance. 
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automatic stay. If a secured party claims accounts receivable, the debtor is a creditor 
of the account debtor, but the automatic stay prevents the secured party from 
collecting the accounts all the same. 43 That B has no in personam payment obligation 
to A is irrelevant. Any time B buys the debtor equity outright, A is a nonrecourse 
creditor with respect to B, and yet the automatic stay clearly applies. Many real estate 
bankruptcies involve nonrecourse mortgages, yet the automatic stay still applies.44 
Indeed, none of the reasons offered against the automatic stay of the senior security 
• • • • 45 
mterest 1s convmcmg. 
A challenging idea in favor of holding As foreclosure immune from Bs 
automatic stay comes from a pre-Code case, First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of 
Chicago v. Holiday Lodge, Inc. (In re Holiday Lodge, Inc.),46 where D conveyed a 
mortgage to A and then leased the premises to B. B was bankrupt and D was not. 
Judge Elmer Schnackenberg ordered that the stay should be vacated: 
[T]he first mortgage here constitutes a lien on the property in 
question superior to debtor's leasehold interest and, to the extent of 
that lien, the debtor had no interest in the real estate. It took its lease 
subject to that mortgage lien. That being so, the district court, as a 
bankruptcy court, had not jurisdiction to restrain a state court 
proceeding to enforce [As] lien on the property to the extent that it 
was superior to any interest belonging to the debtor in that 
property.47 
43 See David Gray Carlson. Turnover of Collateral in Bankruptcy: Must a Secured Party in Possession 
Volunteer?, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 483, 506-07 (1997). · 
44 See, e.g., Sapir v. Hudson Realty Co., (In re Rosalind Gardens Assocs.) 157 D.R. 75, 77 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting nonrecourse mortgagee was granted relieffrom automatic stay in accordance with 
section 362(d)); In re Fuller, 111 B.R. 660,662 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (discussing motion for relief from 
automatic stay by nonrecourse mortgagee). 
4
s Other arguments in this article are similarly unpersuasive. See Holthus, supra note 41 , at 383.For instance: 
An analogous situation is where a debtor owns all or nearly all of the outstanding 
shares of stock in a corporation. Such ownership does not make the corporation itself 
property of the estate, and the automatic stay does not apply to prevent any action against 
the corporation or its assets. The technical and legal distinction between the debtor and 
the corporation must be respected. Likewise, the technical and legal distinction between a 
security interest ... and ... property held by a debtor must be respected. 
Id. (footnote omitted). In fact, the relation between shareholder and corporation is not analogous to that 
between a security interest and an equity interest. A shareholder and a corporation are separate juridical 
persons. A security interest and an equity ownership are both property interests; the fonner inclusive in the 
latter. 
46 300 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1962). 
41 Id. at 519. 
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The idea here is that, since the lease is entirely subject to the lien, and since the lien is 
beyond the bankruptcy estate, the security interest can be enforced without any 
offense to bankruptcy jurisdiction. But this is precisely the "devil's advocate" 
argument presented in the last section to explain why the automatic stay might never 
apply to any security interest of any sort.48 It is true enough that B's lease is entirely 
encompassed in A's lien. It is also true that B owns nothing beyond A's lien. But 
these are the attributes of any debtor equity just as much of B's limited interest in 
debtor equity. 
A contrary case exists, however, under the Bankruptcy Code. In 48th Street 
· 49 Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Group, Inc. (In re 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc.), A 
owned a reversion and D owned a leasehold. D then subleased to B. B was bankrupt, 
but D was not. Judge Frank Altimari held that the automatic stay prevented A's 
termination of D's lease.so His reasoning was phrased quite broadly: 
While it is true that [D] is an incidental beneficiary of our 
decision, this result is permissible where a non-debtor's interest in 
property is intertwined, as in the present case, with that of a bankrupt 
debtor. If action taken against the non-bankrupt party would 
inevitably have an adverse impact on property of the bankrupt estate, 
then such action should be barred by the automatic stay.s1 
Thus, because B had an interest in the "thing," A could take no action whatsoever 
against D with regard to D's interest in the "thing", thanks to the automatic stay 
arising out of B's bankruptcy.s2 This is so, at least, where the termination of D's 
interest implies the termination of B's junior interest. Such reasoning applies just as 
much to B's security interest as it does to B's sublease.s3 
41 See supra Part I. (discussing automatic stay and foreclosure) . 
49 835 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1987). 
50 See id. at 431 . 
5' Id. 
52 A close examination of the facts in 48th Street Steakhouse reveals that Judge Altimari confused A with D. 
In fact, D, a prime tenant of A, conveyed the leasehold to B, who then subleased back to D. D was bankrupt. So 
viewed, the application of the automatic stay was straightforward. But Judge Altimari analyzed the case as if B 
(not D) was the bankrupt. See Berliner, supra note 12, at 207-13. In addition, it is not clear that D, as subtenant, 
could assume the prime lease to which, according to Altimari's wrong analysis, it was not a party. Id. at 
213-14. 
53 See In re Capital Mortg. & Loan, Inc., 35 B.R. 967, 973 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983) (finding senior 
lienholder violated automatic stay by taking quitclaim deed from trustee in lieu of foreclosure when junior 
lienholder was debtor in possession). 
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C. Relations Between the Nonbankrupt Entities 
Back to the case of the junior secured party, if the automatic stay prevents A from 
foreclosing against B, does it thereby follow that A is enjoined from foreclosing 
against D who is not bankrupt? 
For example, suppose the collateral is worth $100 in its unencumbered state, and 
A and B both claim $60. B is bankrupt but D is not. A may not sell the collateral free 
and clear of B's junior security interest, because to do so would violate the automatic 
stay. But might A sell D's residual interest? 
One case sugf;sting so is Roslyn Savings Bank v. Comcoach Corp. (In re 
Comcoach Corp.), where a borrower (D) encumbered real estate and then leased 
premises to a tenant (B). B filed for bankruptcy and the secured creditor (A) moved to 
lift the automatic stay in B's bankruptcy.55 Judge Richard Cardamone ruled that the 
stay should not be lifted, because A was not even a party in interest in B's 
bankruptcy.56 In Cardamone's view, A was not a creditor of B because Bowed rent to 
D---not to A.57 However mistaken this view is,58 Judge Cardamone went on to 
suggest that the foreclosure sale against D was not stayed: 
First, the state foreclosure action, as presently constituted, is not 
stayed. Until [BJ is named as a party-defendant the action does not 
affect the bankrupt estate. New York law provides that lessees are 
necessary parties in foreclosure actions. Necessary parties are not 
always indispensable parties, however, whose absence mandates 
dismissal of the action. The absence of a necessary party in a 
foreclosure action simply leaves such party's rights to the premises 
unaffected. By failing to name [B] as a party-defendant in its 
foreclosure action, [A] has left the debtor in exactly the same 
position as it was in prior to commencement of the suit. Since no 
interest of the bankrupt estate has been affected, no automatic stay 
prohibitingthe continuance of the state foreclosure action exists.59 
54 698 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1983). 
55 See id. at 572-73. 
56 See id. at 575; see also l l U.S.C. § l l09(b) (1994) (defining "party in interest"); Vieland v. First Fed. 
Savs. Bank (In re Vieland) 41 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (noting a party in interest must be 
determined on case by case basis). 
57 See Comcoach, 698 F.2d at 574 (stating that bank was not creditor because it had "no right to payment 
from the bankrupt, since the bankrupt has no obligation on the mortgage"). · 
51 A has a lien on the leasehold itself. According to Bankruptcy Code section 102(2), "'claim against the 
debtor includes claim. against property of the debtor." Hence, A was a creditor of B after all and had standing to 
seek removal of the automatic stay. 
59 Comcoach, 698 F.2d at 574 (citations omitted). 
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In other words, the automatic stay in B's bankruptcy does not prevent foreclosure of 
A's interest against D, so long as the foreclosure sale does not affect B's junior 
interest. 60 
How can this case be reconciled with 48th Street Steakhouse previously 
discussed?61 In 48th Street Steakhouse, A wished relief from the automatic stay to 
foreclose the interests of both B and D. In Comcoach, A wished the same relief, but 
Judge Cardamone indicated that foreclosure against D was permissible, so long as B's 
junior interest was left intact.62 
The ability to sell D's equity interest (but not B's junior security interest) is 
potentially harmful to A, unless care is taken in analyzing the consequences of such a 
. sale. Suppose A sells the collateral to X in a foreclosure sale. X then has the right to 
possess the property against B and B's bankruptcy trustee. Between D and B, B's 
security interest was minor. B's trustee could not seize beneficial possession from D. 
Since X now owns what D had, Xis likewise privileged against B's trustee. 
X knows, however, that she buys subject to B's security interest. Otherwise, A 
has violated the automatic stay. On the numbers presented earlier,X rationally pays a 
maximum of $40. Ironically, $40 is the value of the junior lien on the collateral. 
That is, if A were merely the junior secured party, X also would have paid $40. The 
inability to foreclose B thereby subordinatesA to B. 
It should not be forgotten,63 however, that A has a security interest on B's junior 
security interest in X's property. D could only convey to B a title that A's security 
interest encumbers. Thus, if D had conveyed absolute title to B, B would take title 
subject to A's lien. The same is true if D conveys a junior security interest to B. That 
is, B's security interest is itself encumbered by A's lien.64 
Now A has already recovered $40 and has only a $20 claim remaining. 
Meanwhile, B's bankruptcy trustee may realize on the property by inducing X to 
redeem (for $60) or by selling X's property at auction to some buyer (Y) for $100. If 
X redeems for $60, A is senior for $20. B's trustee is entitled only to the surplus of 
$40. Equilibrium is happily restored. If B's trustee forecloses against .X, A obtains 
60 Compare Brizendine v. Humboldt Express, Inc. (In re Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc.), 118 B.R. 889, 
893 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990) (distinguishing Comcoach). 
61 See 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Group, Inc. (In re Rockefeller Group, Inc.), 835 F.2d 427,431 
(2d Cir. 1987) (Altimari, J.) (finding lease termination notice was void because it violated automatic stay); see 
supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
62 See Comcoach, 698 F.2d at 574. Accord In re Village Rathskeller, Inc., 147 B.R. 665, 669 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Brozman, J.) (noting stay prevents any foreclosure that affects junior leasehold interest); see 
also Irving Byelas lrrevocahle Trust v. KOT Indus., Inc. (In re KOT Indus., Inc.), 32 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding automatic stay would not be lifted because of minor difficulties). 
63 As was done in First Fed. Bank v. Cogar (In re Cogar), 210 B.R. 803, 812 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (Ollason, 
J.). On this case, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
64 One might say that the security agreement between D and B is "chattel paper" insofar as A is concerned, if 
the collateral is goods. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1977) (defining chattel paper as "writings which evidence 
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in ... specific goods"). Hence, the creation of a junior 
security interest on goods implies that a proceeds security interest in chattel paper. 
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$20, B's trustee obtains $40, and X obtains a surplus of $40-exactly what X paid for 
D's equity interest. 
The problem with this view is that it works only when the parties have perfect 
information. If X has no knowledge of B's bankruptcy and takes no warranties of 
title, it isX, not A, who bears the risk of B's bankruptcy. Xpays $100 but obtains D's 
equity (worth nothing) and A's lien (worth only $60). Of course, A only claims $60 
and must return the $40 surplus to B's bankruptcy trustee (who owns B.'s junior lien). 
This $40 distribution reduces the junior lien from $60 to $20. X still owes $20 on a 
nonrecourse basis to B's bankruptcy trustee because X did not understand that B's 
automatic stay prevented A from selling good title to X. Such a conundrum results if 
B's automatic stay prevents A from foreclosing against B and permits A to foreclose 
againstD. 
Against this result, however, stands the strange and unaptly named case of Harsh 
Investment Corp. v. Bialac (In re Bialac),65 where the debtor was a one-sixth cotenant 
of a promissory note. All the cotenants jointly borrowed money, and the note was 
pledged to a bank. Upon default a surety paid the bank and took over the bank's 
position as pledgee. The pledgee then began a foreclosure sale. Hours before the 
sale, the one-sixth owner of the note filed a deftly timed bankruptcy petition. The 
secured party decided to go ahead with the sale of five-sixths of the note, exactly as 
envisioned here. In this sale, the secured party, bidding in its claim, emerged as 
buyer of five-sixths of the note.66 
Judge Otto Skopil ruled that the sale of the five-sixths violated the automatic 
stay.67 The sale was void, and the nonbankrupt cotenants were reestablished as 
owners of the note. The justification: the debtor had a redemption right under U .C.C. 
Section 9-506.68 This redemption right applied not just to the debtor's one-sixths 
cotenancy but to the entire note. Hence, the sale of the not~a "disposition" that 
terminates the redemption right-interfered with the debtor's property right. Hence, 
6s 712 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1983). 
66 See id. at 428.0ddly, the surety was the shareholder of the note's maker, so that the surety was in effect the 
assignee of a claim against its own subsidiary. 
67 See id. at 432. 
61 See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1977).According to this provision: 
Id 
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral . .. the debtor or any 
other secured party may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the 
collateral by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as 
the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and preparing 
the collateral for disposition . . . . 
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the entire thing-not just the debtor's interest in the thing-was deemed protected by 
h · 69 t e automatic stay. 
Under the U .C.C., can a cotenant of a thing redeem the whole thing-or just the 
cotenancy? No case law pre-existed Bialac to support this proposition, but Judge 
Skopil analogized to real estate law, where the right of a cotenant to redeem the 
whole thing is recognized. If this occurs, the other cotenants are reestablished as 
owner, but these others must reimburse the redeeming cotenant within a reasonable 
time or else lose the cotenancy.70 Sometimes it is said that the redeeming cotenant is 
subrogated to the mortgage. That is to say, the other cotenants are deemed to be 
equity owners of the redeemed cotenancies, but the redeeming cotenant is a secured 
creditor with a lien on those cotenancies.71 
Applying these principles to Bialac, the debtor was already the one-sixth owner 
of the promissory note, because the automatic stay prevented the sale of this 
cotenancy. Indeed, the secured party did not purport to sell this one-sixth interest. If 
the debtor were to redeem the other five-sixths, the other cotenants would still own 
the debtor equity in these cotenancies, but the debtor would have legal title to or 
perhaps an Article 9 security interest on the five-sixths. 
That the automatic stay should protect this redemption right translates into this 
proposition: If (1) D grants a lien to A, if (2) B guarantees it, and if (3) B files for 
bankruptcy, the automatic stay restrains D from foreclosing against A. B has the right 
to be subrogated to As mortgage against D. Bialac72 states that the subrogation right 
is property of the estate, and any interference with it violates the stay.73 
69 See In re Capital Mortgage & Loan, Inc., 35 B.R. 967,971 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983) (Dahl, J.) (noting that 
automatic stay was violated when senior lienholder accepts lien deed thereby injuring junior's right of 
redemption pre-foreclosure). 
70 The loss of the cotenancy is sometimes justified on grounds of !aches or estoppel. See 2 AMERICAN LA w 
OF PROPERTY§ 6.16, at 71 (James A. Casner ed., 1952) (discussing statutory right of cotenants to redeem after 
foreclosure sale). 
71 See id. § 6.17, at 77 (noting the tactics of cotenants in enforcing contributions when one has discharged 
mortgage or other encumbrance); cf Fundaburk v. Cody, 72 So.2d 710, 718 (Ala. 1954) (adjusting equities of 
parties by giving occupying cotenants compensation for money spent on mortgage debt). 
72 In so holding, Judge Skopil wrote of the debtor's redemption right over the five-sixths that it is not "within 
protections afforded by a literal interpretation of section 362, yet they should be protected by the stay if the 
purposes of the [Bankruptcy Code], the orderly disposition of all property in which the debtor has some 
interest, are to be achieved." 712 F.2d at 432 (citations omitted). In fact, the literal words of section 362(a) do 
support the result. Thus, section 362(aX4) stays "any act to ... enforce any lien against property of the estate." 
II U.S.C. § 362(aX4) (1994). If the debtor's right to redeem the five-sixths is conceived as property of the 
estate, and if the secured party's postpetition sale ends that right to redeem, then the literal words of section 
362(aX4) prevent the sale. On the theory that acts in violation of stay are void, the sale of the five-sixths may 
be set aside. See. e.g., Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992) (Wiggins, 
J.) (demonstrating that acts in violation of the stay are void). See generally Robert R. Niccolini, Note, The 
Voidability of Actions Taken in Violation of the Automatic Stay: Application of the Information-Forcing 
Paradigm, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1677-86 (1992) (preferring "voidable" over "void" on policy grounds). 
73 See Harsh Inv. Corp; v. Bialac (In re Bialac). 712 F.2d 426,431 (9th Cir. 1983). For other cases in which 
the surety's bankruptcy petition stayed foreclosure against the nonbankrupt principal obligor, see Cohen v. 
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That the bankruptcy of a surety should stay foreclosure of a security interest 
against the obligor sounds disturbing, and so some courts have attempted to 
distinguish Bialac. Thus, in Saratoga Group, Ltd. v. Peoples National Bank (In re 
Geris),74 a surety filed for bankruptcy. The principal obligor (not a bankrupt) 
intervened to claim that foreclosure of a mortgage against the obligor would violate 
the stay in the surety's bankruptcy.75 Judge Dickson Phillips ruled that the stay did not 
impede the foreclosure.76 Phillips distinguished Bialac on the ground that Bialac 
involved a debtor with an "ownership" interest in a thing, whereas Geris surety had 
only the right of subrogation.77 But surely a contingent interest in a mortgage is 
"ownership." Judge Phillips overlooks the fact that the reason the stay restrained the 
pledgee in Bialac was that the debtor could redeem his own cotenancy and the 
cotenancy of others. If such a redemption were to be made, the debtor would have a 
security interest on these cotenancies. Bialac was nothing more than an ordinary 
suretyship case. Judge Phillips's distinction therefore fails. 
Judge Phillips fully understood the consequence of holding that the surety's 
bankruptcy stays foreclosure against the principal obligor: 
Certainly [the surety] has an interest, and a ma:.:rial one, in 
having the value of the ... property maximized, insofar as it bears 
directly on the size of the deficiency ... But if we were to accept this 
interest as sufficient to invoke in [the principal obligor's favor] the 
automatic stay provision . . . we would be cutting off foreclosure 
rights of secured creditors in any property standing as security for a 
debt that happened to be guaranteed by a bankrupt. This cannot have 
been an intended function of the automatic stay provision, any more 
than it was intended to prevent a secured creditor from collecting 
from or foreclosing on the property of a bankrupt debtor's 
guarantors. 78 
This last point is a disturbing one. The J>rincipal obligor's bankruptcy is not sup~sed 
to restrain collection against the surety,79 yet the surety's bankruptcy, under Bialac, 
Hahn (In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc.), 39 B.R. 551, 555 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984) (Dahl, J.), vacated, 12 B.R. 
205 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1986); Capital Mortgage & Loan, Inc., 35 B.R. at 971. 
74 973 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1992). 
75 See id. at 321 . On standing of nondebtors to invoke the automatic stay, see supra text accompanying notes 
54-64. 
16 See Geris, 973 F.2d at 320. 
n See id. 
71 Id at 321 ( citation omitted). 
19 See Union Trust Co. v. Willsea, 275 N.Y. 164, 169 (1937) (stating liability of a surety for bankrupt 
principal is not altered by discharge of principal bankruptcy proceeding); Michael H. Rubin, Ruminations 
on Suretyships, 51 LA. L. REV. 565,585 (1997) (stating that sureties are bound even where creditor has no 
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powerfully prevents foreclosure against the principal obligor. Bialac therefore 
resembles the notorious Deprizio case,80 in which a guaranty by an insider extended 
the preference period to one year for the obligee. In both cases, the lender is worse 
81 · 
off for having taken the guaranty. 
Nevertheless, the idea of debtor rehabilitation is that bankruptcy trustees should 
be able to administer assets whenever a senior secured party lacks the incentive to 
maximize value.82 These goals fully apply to bankrupt sureties. Thus, Judge Phillips 
point, though powerful, contradicts the principle on which bankruptcy jurisdiction 
over collateral is premised. The surety's automatic stay therefore shields the principal 
obligor on both the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and its policy reserving 
appreciation value to the unsecured creditors of bankruptcy debtors. 83 
III. JUNIOR SECURED CREDITORS AND STANDING 
One last matter remains. Suppose D grants a senior security interest to A and a 
junior security interest to B. D then files for bankruptcy. May B (quite solvent) 
protest violations of D's automatic stay by A? 
Most courts believe that the junior secured farty does not have standing. 84 In City 
of Farmers Branch v. Pointer (In re Pointer),8 a secured party sought a declaration 
that superpriority tax liens on its collateral would violate the automatic stay in the 
debtor's bankruptcy.86 Judge Carolyn Dineen King ruled against the secured party on 
way to collect from the principal obligor); Gary L. Monserud, The Privileges of Suretyship For Delegating 
Parties Under U.C.C. Section 2-210 in Lights of the New Restatement of Suretyship, 37 WM. & MARYL. 
REV. 1307, 1370 (1996) (discussing obligee retaining rights against secondary obligor after release of 
primary obligor). 
'
0 See Levit v. lngersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). 
11 At least Deprizio is limited to insider guaranties. Bialac's logic applies to any kind of suretyship 
whatsoever. 
12 On this premise, see supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (discussing trustee's control of collateral 
claimed by secuwd parties). 
13 See Patrick Fitzgerald, Note, Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a) and Undersecured Creditors: What 
Date For Valuation?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 1959 (1987) (discussing appreciating collateral with respect 
to unsecured creditor's goals); see also Mary Josephine Newborn, Undersecured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy:Dewsnup, Nobleman, and the Decline of Priority, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547, 549-50 (1993) 
(discussing claims of unsecured creditors). 
14 See Tilley v. Vucurevich (In re Pecan Goves of Arizona), 951 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir. 1991) (Tang, J.) 
(finding where trustee abandoned appeal from decision upholding secured party's foreclosure sale, other 
creditors did not have standing to pursue it). 
as 952 F.2d 82, 89 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding liens voidable and secured creditor lacked standing to pursue 
avoidance actions on behalf of original bankruptcy estate). 
16 Many courts had held that a postpetition tax lien accruing automatically on property was "void" for 
violating the automatic stay. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller (In re Fuller), 134 B.R. 945, 949 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1992) (concluding automatic stay prevents attachment or perfection of tax lien); Lincoln Savs. Bank v. Suffolk 
County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n), 880 F.2d 1540, 1545 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating "even if it 
were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the [taxing authority], that lien, attaching to the 
property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay."); Carl L. Bueki, The Automatic Stay and Real 
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the theory that the creditor did not have standing. Judge King also emphasized that 
the creditor's theory was a disguised avoidance of a postpetition transfer under section 
549. As this section gives only bankruptcy trustees standing, the creditor must 
therefore not be entitled to it.87 On the other hand, if one believes that actions in 
violation of the stay are "void ab initio, "88 the creditor's action need not be viewed as 
a theft of turf granted to trustees under section 549. 89 
The following difference exists between section 549 avoidance and voidness ab 
initio. If the superpriority lien is avoided under section 549, the lien is preserved for 
the benefit of the estate under section 551 and can be asserted against the junior 
secured party. But if the superpriority lien is merely void for violating the stay, the 
lien is deemed never to have arisen, in which case the junior secured party wins the 
promotion that section 551 is designed to prevent. By denying the junior secured 
party standing, Judge King, in Pointer, preserved for the bankruptcy trustee the right 
to avoid and preserve the voidable superpriority lien.90 
Some cases do recognize junior creditor standing. In Barnett Bank v. Trust Co. 
Bank (In re Ring),91 Judge Lamar Davis ruled that a solvent junior secured party had 
standing to bring an adversary proceeding against a senior secured party who had 
violated an automatic stay arising from the equity owner's bankruptcy. In so ruling, 
he noted that other creditors are the ultimate beneficiaries of the stay: 
Property Tax Liens, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 233,235 (1992) (noting Second and Third Circuit decisions held that 
automatic stay precludes perfection of these liens). However, in 1994, Congress solved the controversy by 
enacting section 362(bX18), exempting the attachment postpetition tax liens from the automatic stay. See 11 
U.S.C. § 362 (bX18) (1994) (allowing for perfection ofpostpetition ad valorem tax). 
87 See Pointer, 952 F.2d at 88. A junior secured party tried a different tactic in McRoberts v. S.I.V.I. (In re 
Bequette), 184 B.R. 327, 334-35 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1995), by convincing a chapter 13 trustee to challenge a 
senior tax lien with priority over a fixtures priority interest. The debtor did not redeem during the statutory 
period, and the buyer applied for a deed in the circuit court of the county, without moving to lift the automatic 
stay. Judge Kenneth Meyers held that, though it was a technical violation, the court would issue no sanctions. 
In fact, it was probably not even that. The debtor's title simply did not exist once the redemption period ran out. 
In any case, Judge Meyers also refused to declare the deed void, since the debtor had no grounds to resist the 
deed. But he also complained that the chapter 13 trustee had no business using its power to benefit a junior 
secured creditor. 
88 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Constitution Bank v. Tubbs, 68 F.3d 685, 692 n.6 
(3d Cir. I 995) ("Generally, judicial actions and proceedings against the debtor are void ab initio absent relief 
from the stay.") (citation omitted); Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 572-73 (9th Cir. 
1992) (asserting that IRS tax assessment violated stay and was void; ability to annul stay retroactively under 
section 362(d) is inconsistent with stay provisions being void and not merely voidable). 
89 See Barnett Bank v. Trust Co. Bank (In re Ring), 178 B.R. 570, 578 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995) (Davis, J.) 
(criticizing Pointer for not adhering to voidness ab initio). In Schwartz, 954 at 573-74, Judge Charles Wiggins 
ruled that involuntary liens are void ab initio, but this did not deprive section 549 of its turf, because section 
549 required voluntary conveyances by the debtor. 
90 Cf Cohen v. Hahn (In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc.), 39 B.R. 551, 555 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984) (Dahl, J.) 
(equating foreclosure in violation of automatic stay with illegal section 549 transfer), vacated, 72 B.R. 205 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1986). 
91 178 B.R. 570 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995). 
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[A] creditor honors the stay with the expectation that it is not 
losing ground to other creditors because the bankruptcy court will 
not allow a violation of the stay to stand and will punish any party 
that violates it.92 
Davis saw two bad consequences in denying junior secured parties standing to 
enforce the stay against the senior secured party. First, it would signal to the senior 
secured party that she could violate the automatic stay with impunity, so long as an 
undersecured junior lienor exists.93 Second, the denial of standing would make a 
mockery of the principle that acts taken in violation of the automatic stay are void ab 
.. . 94 
mzllo. 
The problem with this view is that it interferes with the trustee's discretion to 
administer the estate. If the trustee has good reason not to pursue sanctions against 
the senior secured creditor, this reason should be respected. If the junior secured 
party thinks that the trustee is breaching her fiduciary duty by not pursuing these 
sanctions, the junior secured party should pursue the remedies given to any creditor to 
force a trustee to perform. These might include the removal of a trustee or the 
delegation of the adversarial action to a creditor's committee.95 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A bankruptcy trustee is deemed to be a judicial lien creditor who represents all 
unsecured creditors. As such, the trustee is a junior creditor whenever there exists a 
senior perfected security interest on property of the estate. At state law, junior 
secured creditors may not usually interfere with the senior creditor's right of 
foreclosure. But bankruptcy law and policy reverses this presumption, so that a 
bankruptcy trustee might maximize value for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. 
When a debtor has bought collateral subject to a lien that was created before the 
debtor's purchase, the debtor is a nonrecourse debtor against the existing secured 
creditor. The automatic stay clearly restrains the secured creditor, even though no 
92 Id. at 577. 
93 See id. (noting unfortunate consequences in denying corporate creditor standing to initiate contempt 
proceedings). 
94 See id.; see also In re Franck, 171 B.R. 893, 894 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994) (Pappas, J.) (granting standing to 
junior secured party harmed by senior foreclosure). 
9' See 11 U.S.C. §324 ~1994) (providing for removal of trustee or examiner for cause); see also Glenny v. 
Langdon, 98 U.S. 20, 3(1 (1878) (allowing creditors to petition court to remove and replace trustee); Marcy 
J. K. Tiffany, A Time of Change-A Two Year Retrospective on the Office of the United States Trustee, 21 
CAL. BANKR. J. 13, 18 (1993) (discussing remedial actions that result from trustee's failure to meet their 
fiduciary responsibilities); Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors ' Committees Under Chapter 11 
of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995, 999-1001 (1993) (discussing role of creditor's 
committee's under bankruptcy code). 
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privity exists between the creditor and the debtor. The same rule should apply when 
the debtor buys an interest that is less than an absolute title. Thus, if the debtor is a 
junior secured creditor of some non-bankrupt entity, the automatic stay should 
restrain the senior secured creditor from foreclosure. Any such foreclosure would 
destroy property of the estate, in violation of Bankruptcy Code section 362(aX4), 
which prevents "any act to ... enforce any lien against property of the estate. "96 
The Supreme Court has proclaimed in dictum that a lien owned by a bankrupt is a 
"minor" interest that does not enter the bankruptcy estate. But this remark is limited 
to the relations between an equity owner and a bankrupt secured creditor. When two 
secured creditors have claims against the collateral of a nonbankrupt entity, each lien 
may be minor insofar as the non bankrupt entity is concerned, but vis-a-vis each other, 
the two liens are "major" in their relation. Hence, in the bankruptcy of the junior 
secured creditor, an automatic stay arises that prevents the senior secured party from 
foreclosing on the property of a nonbankrupt entity. Such foreclosure would destroy 
property of the junior creditor's bankruptcy estate. 
Both the plain language and the implicit policy of the Bankruptcy Code dictate 
this result. The unsecured creditors of the junior secured party would benefit from 
the accrual of appreciation value in the junior lien if the junior's bankruptcy trustee is 
allowed to administer the foreclosure sale. The junior lien cannot be distinguished 
from a bankrupt's nonrecourse ownership of collateral. The rule for the one should 
also be the rule for the other. 
96 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). 
